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1ABSTMCT
Two applications of the concept of statistical equilibrium, taken from statistical
mechanics, are compared: a simple model of a pure exchange economy, constructed as
an alternative to a walrasian exchange equilibrium, and a simple model of an industry,
in which statistical equilibrium is used as a complement to the classical long period
equilibrium. The postulate of equal probability of all possible microstates is critically
re-examined. Equal probabilities are deduced as a steady state of linear and non-linear
Markov chains.
2Introduction
The concept of statistical equilibrium is a fundamental analytical tool in
physics and particularly in statistical mechanics. After having borrowed the classical
mechanics concept of equilibrium, economic theory has occasionally turned its
attention to the other concept of probabilistic equilibrium. In fact, since the
contributions which appeared in the 50s and the early 60s it is only recently that
serious attempts have been made to revise and develop the notion of statistical
equilibrium in economics. Past contributions include Champernown (1953), Simon-
Bonini (1958), Newman-Wolf (1961) and Steindl (1962) and were mainly related to
Gibrat's Law (1931) and to Pareto distribution. Recent works, explicitly linked to
thermodynamics, are E. Farjoun - M. Machover (1983) and, in paficular, Foley
(1991, 1994) .
In economics a statistical equilibrium is a most probable distribution of certain
economic entities (say firms or individuals) which cannot all be distinguished one from
another, rather than a particular configuration in which each entity is identified. In
other words, this equilibrium is a macrostate with maximum number of realizations
(microstates) and, as such, is a distinct concept from a state obtained by the simple
inclusion of some random variable in the relations which determine a classical
equilibrium.l In this work two applications of the concept of statistical equilibrium to
economic theory will be formulated and compared using simple models. Furthermore it
will be shown that, under sufftcient conditions, a state of equal probability of
microstates - a basic postulate in statistical mechanics - in the long period is consistent
with unequal transition probabilities.
In section 1 the first application is a model of a pure exchange economy,
constructed as a special case of Foley's (1994) model in which statistical equilibrium
appears as an altemative to the Walrasian equilibrium. In section 2 the second
application is a model of an industry in which statistical equilibrium is used as a
complement to the classical long period equilibrium. It will be argued that only the
latter application maintains the notion of statistical equilibrium adopted in the field of
physics; whereas the former differs from it on an essential point and resolves itself into
a concept of equilibrium similar to that of temporary equilibrium adopted in
economics. In section 3 the postulate of equal probability is re-examined and a
simple case of linear Markov chains is presented, in which equal probability is a steady
state of a stochastic process. In section 4 this uniform probability outcome is
generalized to non-linear Markov chains, applying a theorem proved by Fujimoto and
Krause (1985).
I See Parrinello (1990).
l. Statistical eauilibrium in a oure exchanee economv
Let us make a simple example of statistical equilibrium for an exchange
economy, as a special case of the statistical theory of markets developed by Foley
(1991-1994). In this theory the elementary unit of analysis is the individual offer set :
"The marlret begins with agents defined by offer sets reflecting their information,
technical pos sibilitie s, endowments and preferenc e s " (p. 3 2 4.
"In terms of standard production-exchange model,...., offer sets consist of technically
feasible transactions leading to Jìnal consumption bundles that are preferred to initial
endowments" ( Foley p.32a)
Suppose that there are only 4 agents e,o2,bt,b2 and two goods X,Y the
quantities of which are measured by integers. There is a total of 4 units of good X and
4 of good Y which are equally distributed at the beginning: each individual therefore
has an endowment of one unit of each good. V/e will athibute to the agents very simple
preferences: agerrts ar,a., like good X, but are indifferent to good Y; whilst agents
br,b, like good Y, but are indifferent to good X. An agent's transaction is a vector of
quantities of the two goods with a plus sign to indicate a net acquisition, a minus sign
for a net cession and zero if the initial endowment is maintained.
The offer set of an agent is the set of transactions which are weakly preferable
to and feasible for him in relation to his initial endowment. In Foley's model the
agents that have the same offer set are considered indistinguishable and represent a
tvoe of asent.
In the figures below the lattices represent parts ofthe offer sets ofagents oftype A and
B as feasible transaction sets. The null transaction (0,0) is included among the
possibilities.
Type A
2
Type B
In the example we can therefore find two types of agents: type A (to which ar,a,
belong) and type B (to which br,brbelong). These types can be identified by their offer
sets which are distinct as far as their preferences are concemed, but not for their
endowments.
Table I describes the feasible microstates of the exchange economy.
TABLE. I
(0 0) (r -1) (-1 l)
ar ra, ,br rb,
ar rb qr b,
Ar,b. a1 b1
a"b, al b.,
arb, ar b1
0t ,Cl, br,b,
It is to be noted that no exchange takes place in the first microstate and each agent in
the last one acquires one unit of his preferred good against one unit of his indifferent
good. In the other four microstates two agents make one preferred transaction, whilst
the other two remain in their initial position.
Let us consider the feasible statistical aggregates or macrostates of the
exchange economy by treating agents of the same type as indistinguishable and
grouping all microstates with the same distribution of types of agents. In the example
5we find three macrostates, two of which are made of only one microstate (the first and
the last one represented in table I) and one made by four microstates (the others).
Let us assign equal probabilities to all feasible microstates.
A statistical equilibrium is a macrostate with maximum probability, that is with the
maximum number of feasible equally probable microstates. In the example this
macrostate is the one with four microstates, in which, for each type of agent, one of the
two benefits from the exchange by acquiring a unit of his preferred good and by giving
up a unit of the indifferent good, whilst the other agent remains at the status quo.
A market statistical equilibrium in the model developed by Foley possesses the
following interesting features that contrast with those shared by a walrasian general
equilibrium:
1.In general it is not Pareto-efficient;
2.It does not imply a uniform exchange ratio between each pair of commodities over
all
transactions;
3.A uniform entropy price is associated to each good: this price is a shadow price
determined by solving an entropy maximizing problem under the total endowment
constraints.
Property I is straightforward in our exchange model, as the most probable macrostate
is Pareto-inferior compared to that in which all the agents obtain a unit of the preferred
good in exchange for the other good. Instead properties 2 and 3 are not evident in this
simple model and we shall not be concerned with them for the sake of the following
argument.
It should be emphasized that the statistical equilibrium of the exchange
economy is determined by offer sets that depend on the initial endowments of each
individual. In general the offer sets undergo endogenous change if the economy is
conceived in real time. To make this point clear, it is suffrcient to assume that the two
goods are non perishable and that the economy is subject to two trials and two
corresponding observations. Let us suppose that the following microstate is realized in
the first trial:
Then at the second trial the individual endowment will differ from that at the beginning
of the first trial. Therefore the types of agents and the number of each type will differ
from the initial stage, even if we assume that the preferences do not change. Hence the
macrostate which has been defined as statistical equilibrium at the first trial is
longer so at the second. At the second trial each agent will represent a distinct type:
a, with endowments (1,1) and offer set {(0 0) (l -l) (2 -l)...\
a, with endowments (2,0) and offer set {(0 0)}
ór with endowments (1,1) and offer set {(0 0) Cl 1) Cl 2) ....}
b2 wfth endowments (0,2) and offer set {(0 0)};
At the second trial the agents ar, b, prefer their respective initial endowments to the
outcome of any feasible transaction; whilst the agents ar, b, prefer any positive amount
of the preferred good in exchange for the unit of the good they are indifferent towards.
The feasible microstates after the second trial are described below
TABLE II
(0 0) (l -l) (-l 1)
ar ro, ,br rb,
o"bt qr bl
From the statistical point of view the sample space has changed. The two microstates
in table II each have probability ll2 at each trial. Howevef, as the trials are repeated an
indefinite number of times, the second microstate will be realized with probability I
and when that happens the economy will have reached a Pareto-efficient
configuration.2 At that point the of[er set of each agent will be represented by the null
vector (0,0), that is by the absence of any further transaction.
One may well ask whether the statistical equilibrium of exchange, as defined
above, preserves the concept of statistical equilibrium in physics. The answer is no.
The latter has the relative persistence of its determinants in common with the classical
equilibrium in economics; by contrast, the statistical exchange equilibrium, as
illustrated in the example, does not possess this prerequisite and from this point of
view it is similar to the concept of temporary equilibrium in economics. Furthennore,
if the model of statistical equilibrium of the exchange economy is interpreted in real
time, it becomes a model of statistical disequilibrium, with certain transition
probabilities that imply an absorbing microstate. This state is a Pareto-efficient
2In a certain sense the agenl.s ar,a2,b1,b, cottld not be distinguished into type A and B right from the very first
trial if "distinguishability" also requires "observability". In fact at the beginning all agents have the same initial
endowments, whilst their preferences, the only feature which in this case identifies the types, are not observable
characteristics.
7equilibrium. The stochastic feature is inherent only in the adjustment (or relaxation)
process but not in the final equilibrium of the exchange. In a more general model with
many Pareto-effrcient microstates, we would find a problem of indeterminacy similar
to the one found in a Walrasian exchange model if we assume that transactions can
occur at disequilibrium prices in the adjustment process towards equilibrium. In this
case the convergence of the stochastic process towards a Walrasian equilibrium is
possible, but in general this equilibrium state is not a walrasian equilibrium relatively
to the initial endowments. As a consequence, the statistical exchange equilibrium is
"statistical" only because it is reached by a succession of stochastic disequilibria when
it is stable, but it is not statistical in so far as it coincides with a microstate which takes
probability I at the limit.
2. A model of stotisticol eauilibrium of the industrv
Now we shift to a more poúe application of statistical equilibrium. Let us
suppose now that an industry is in a long period competitive equilibrium, under
constant retums to scale at the firm level. Suppose that its product can take only integer
numbers 1,2,3,... Let Q be the quantity produced and N the number of firms which can
produce at the minimum cost per unit of output. With these hypotheses, if D is the
demand for the product at the long period prices, the theory of classical equilibrium
determines Q from the equation Q: D, but does not determine the size of each firm.
Let us consider now the feasible microstates of the industy which can be
obtained by distributing in every possible way the N firms among the possible sizes
measured by the quantities 0,1,2,3.... In order to illustrate this we will present an
example similar to that used by others (A. F. Brown, 1967) to introduce the concept of
statistical equilibrium with reference to the distribution of a given amount of energy
among agivennumberof particles of aperfect gas. Letus assume Q:3; N:4 and
call the four firms (a),(b),(c),(d). The 20 feasible microstates of the industry are
described in the following table.
ITABLE III
Firm size measured by amounts of output
t2
1l (a) (b) (c) (d)
2l (a) (b) (d) (c)
3l (a) (c) (d) (b)
4l (b) (c) (d) (a)
sl (a) (b) (c) (d)
6l (a) (b) (d) (c)
71(a) (c) (b) (d)
8l (a) (c) (d) (b)
el (a) (d) (b) (c)
101 (a) (d) (c) o)
l ll G) (c) (a) (d)
I2l (b) (c) (d) (a)
131 (b) (d) (a) (c)
r4l o) (d) (c) (a)
151 (c) (d) (a) (b)
161 (c) (d) (b) (a)
t7l (a) (b) (c) (d)
181 O) (a) (c) (d)
lel (c) (a) (b) (d)
201 (d) (a) (b) (c)
Let us adopt the term "macrostate" to indicate a statistical aggregate of
microstates (a distribution), obtained by assuming that the firms are not distinguishable
from each other. The firms are not distinguished either because we are not interested in
their identification or because they cannot be distinguished. In our example three
macrostates of the industry are feasible
- three inactive firms and a firm of size 3;
J0
9- two inactive firms, a size-l firm and asize-2frmr;
- one inactive firm and three size-l firms.
The first macrostate is generated by the hrst four microstates; the second by the next
12 and the third by the last four.
In the general case let us indicate
n: (no,n1,/t2,....,ne) a feasible macrostate in which no firms are size 0, n, firms are
size |,....,no firms are size Q on the condition that
no+nt*nr*....nn=N (l)
Let w(n) be the number of feasible microstates with distribution n :
(no,nr rÍ12,....rflg).
Combinatorial analysis gives
rr(n)= 
. .t'. ,
nolnrlnr!...nn1,
where by convention 0!:1.
(2)
A macrostate n: (n0,nr,fi2,....,flg) is feasible if it satisfies, besides the equality (l),
the conservation condition of the total quantity Q
Ùno +ln, +2n, +'..+ Qro = Q (3)
The total number of feasible microstates is
z = lw(n),
with summation over all macrostut", whiclisatisfr (1) and(3).
We may have an idea of the order of change in w(n) in response to variations in
n, as the number of firms is slightly larger than the number represented in the table, if
we assume3 N: 20 and Q:20. In this case, we will have for the macrostate made up
of 8 inactive firms, 6 size-l frrms, 4 size-2 firms and 2 size-3 firms:
201
w = 
- 
=2x108.8t6l4t2l
By contrast for the macrostate in which all the firms are of a uniform size equal to I we
find
201w- '-1.
201
It is clear how enormous the difference is between the multiplicity of microstates in the
first case, which represents a decreasing distribution compared with the single
3This numerical example has been taken from Brown (1967.p. I23)
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microstate with a uniform distribution. So far we have followed combinatorial
analysis.
To move onto the concept of statistical equilibrium we have to assume a
probability distribution. In statistical physics we find more than one assumption of
probability on this point. In the so-called Maxwell-Boltznann distribution equal
probability is athibuted to each microstate; different assumptions of probability can be
found, however, at the basis of the Bose-Einstein and of the Fermi-Dirac distributions.a
V/e will adopt the Maxwell-Boltzmann hypothesis of equiprobability initially as an a
priori; then we will obtain this uniform probability from other assumptions.
In the example illustrated in table III, each microstate has probability 1/20;
whilst the three macrostates have respectively probabilities l/5, 315,ll5. The statistical
equilibrium of the industry is the second macrostate with probability 3l5.In this case
the small number of microstates, used for the purpose of the exposition, does not yet
enable us to attribute a useful theoretical role to this equilibrium macrostate. In fact
statistical equilibrium needs a sufficiently large number N (a typical case is that of the
particles of gas considered in statistical physics).
In general, in order to determine !, the following maximum problem has to be
solved
maxr.r,(n) =
noftt*-"ne nolnrlnrl...nnl
subject to no + nt t n2r....nn = N
Ùno +ln, +2nr+...+Qnn : Q.
By adopting a similar demonstration to that given in statistical physicss, the following
solution, as shown in Appendix I, can be obtained by an approximation in the
continuum and for N and Q large numbers.
N!
e-pt4 = 
^i o I s = o,1,...,e.S 
--F"tvL/
s=0
(4)
with p = l^(I +
where ln is the natural logarithm.
;)
> 0. (s)
4 For a comparison of Maxwell-Boltanann's, Bose-Einstein's and Fermi-Dirac's so-called statistics, see
W. Feller (1970).
sSimilar demonstrations can be found in Fast (1970); Brown (1967), .Hollinger and, Zenzpn(1985).
l_1
Hence the most probable macrostate n is a distribution of firms which decreases
according to a geometric progression as the size increases; as
no nl 
...,....nr_, = 
", 
. (6)
nt n2 ne
From (5) we obtain
eF 
-r
Having reached this result, the initial assumption that Q, the quantity produced by the
industry, is a quantity in non-statistical classical equilibrium, determindd on the
demand side, becomes important. Substituting Q: D in (7), we obtain:
eF 
-l
Equations (6) and (8) show that as the demand D increases, ceteris paribus, the
coeffrcient p decreases and, therefore, the dispersion of firms among classes of ever
increasing size grows. It is worth noting that the ratio DA.{, demand per number of
ftrms, plays a similar role to that played by temperature T in the corresponding
physical problem determining the most probable distribution of particles or harmonic
oscillators among a certain amount of energy.
Entroplt
We can interpret the equilibrium of the industry in terms of entropy. Let p, be
the probability of microstate i; and let us measure the improbabilify of microstate i by
the logarithm
010J-XI, 
---LrLp..P, t
We can then define entropy S(n) of ttre macrostate n the average improbability of the
microstates of which it is composed, where the weights are the probabilities p,:
O_
N
(8).D
N
(7)
w(n)
S(n) : 
-I
L
orh pi OK
1,2
If all microstates in the macrostate n have probability p,
nis
the entropy of
S(n) = !^*6)
and the entropy of a most probable macrostate n is S(n) = I* w (n).
Therefore s statistical equilibrium of the industry is a macrostate that has maximum
entropy; hence, under the assumption of equal probability, a macrostate with maximum
h/(n)
number of possible realizations. As N increases, the ratio ; decreases, whilst
t)lxù rnl(n)
----n- tends to 1, where m is the total number of microstates. Then, for N large,Lnm
the entropy of the industry in its most probable state can be written
n
S(w(n) ) = lnn. Since the improbability of. a macrostate n is
0m0nLrL- - Ln m-dn w(n), we can also say that for a large N a statistical
w(n)
equilibrium belongs to a set of macrostates with almost zero improbability, in the sense
that w(n)turns out incomparably greater than w(n) associated with any other
macrostate n outside the equilibrium set.
This property means that a macroscopic regularity (equilibrium) exists in terms
of firm distribution. Such regularity emerges in real time, if we suppose that the
number of potential firms N and the quantity in demand D are stationary. A statistical
equilibrium can therefore be considered like the image of a film, which is made up of
the same perceived scene repeated on a large number of frames, interspersed every so
often with pictures of other scenes: when the film is run at a sufficiently high speed,
the viewer is hardly aware of these odd scenes at all, whilst he perceives the main.
scene. Leaving this metaphor to one side, it must be stressed that the notion of
statistical equilibrium which has been formulated here, does not substitute the
classical equilibrium of the industry, but it does presuppose it and stands as a
complement to it. In fact the stationarity of Q is not a physical necessity (like energy
conservation), but rather a property of classical equilibrium in which Q is determined
by the effective demand at the long run competitive prices. It is to be noted that the
stationarity of the most probable distribution of firms hides an incessant movement at a
microeconomic level: if it were possible to observe the trajectory of each firm (a not so
impossible task compared with the case of a trajectory of a particle in physics) over a
suffrciently long period, a ftrm would be seen to move through the whole range of
1
t
lr(n)
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sizes and the industry would pass through all feasible microstates. This would be true
in principle.
In economics, as in the physics of gas, the number of units involved has to be
large for this concept to be of use for the analysis. Thus in the model of the industry
the number of firms N has to be large enough.It must be noted, incidentally, that there
are some diffrculties in observing N, in so far as many potentially active firms are
inactive in equilibrium. Also the quantity Q, which is measured by integers, had to be
assumed to be large for the pu{pose of the solution given in appendix I. Clearly the
problem of the numerosity of Q differs from the one concerning N, as it does not seem
so harmful to assume a suffrcient divisibility of the product.
3. The choice of the sample space and the assumofioh of eaual probability
In all main formulations of the method of statistical equilibrium in physics (the
Maxwell-Boltzrnann distribution, the Bose-Einstein distribution and the Fermi-Dirac
distribution), a set of feasible microstates (the sample space) is defined at a certain
level of analysis and then equal probability is assigned to these microstates. This
analytical level is chosen on the basis of the logic of the problem, of a separate theory
or of an intuition, the usefulness of this choice being tested by its predictive capability.
In applying the statistical equilibrium approach, two methodological pitfalls should be
avoided. With respect to the phenomenon under investigation: a) the assumed sample
space might lack persistency and b) the assumed microstates might not have equal
probability. Let us examine now the applications of the statistical equilibrium
approach to the exchange economy (section 1) and to the economy of the industry
(section 2) atthe light of the above criterion.
In the application to the exchange economy, the choice of the sample space
and the hypothesis of equal probability must be assessed on the basis of some implicit
assumption of "rational" individual behaviour.s In this case it is hard to explain why
the probability of a Pareto-effrcient microstate is and remains not greater than the
6 \\e principle of insrfficient reason has been called upon by Foley (1994) to justif the hypothesis of
equal probabilities of the feasible microstates. Of course this principle is of little use for justiffing the
choice between feasible and unfeasible microstates.
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probability of any inefficient microstate which were not Pareto-inferior to the initial
state. For example, the microstate described in the first row of Table I does not
represent any Pareto-improvement, but it has, nevertheless, been athibuted the same
probability as any of the other microstates (described in the other rows) that do in fact
imply an improvement. We observe that the latter problem prevents the exchange
statistical equilibrium from strengthening its theoretical role in the following case,'in
which the diffrculty arising from the non-persistence of the initial endowments does
not arise. In the pure exchange economy let us assume the goods to be labour services,
instead of durable goods, and the initial endowments to be made up only of persistent
labour capacities of workers to provide those services. By this hypothesis, if we assign
all the feasible microstates equal probability, it is possible to formulate a statistical
equilibrium for the exchange of labour services in real time, instead of a temporary
statistical equilibrium. In spite of this, there still remain the same objections to the
hypothesis of equal probability: as if on each trial the agents described by the model
would look for each other and accept with equal chance any transaction which does not
entail an inferior position for them, compared to the absence of exchange. The
rationality of these agents seem to be minimal. It would be more reasonable to attribute
equal probability to those microstates which imply Pareto-efficient allocations of
labour-services and lower probabilities to all the other microstates?. Unfortunately no
general criterion seems to be available a priori for assigning non-uniform probabilities
within exogeneously given offer sets.
Also in the application to the economy of the industry, illustrated in section 2,
the appropriatness of the choice of the sainple space and of the equal probability
assumption can be questioned, albeit for different reasons. .
On the one hand, we observe that the choice of the sample space, made of all
possible microstates of the industry, belongs to the general model of placing randomly
a given number of balls (firms) in a given number of cells (firm sizes); then
aggregation runs by treating the balls as indistinguishable, whereas the cells are kept as
distinct entities. I This model might not be appropriate, if the distribution of many
customers among many firms is an essential element in the enumeration of the
microstates of a production system with exchange. Suppose for simplicity that in the
model described by Table III there are three customers and each customer demands
one unit of outptut, as if he would represent an economic "quantum". In this case,
7 Foley himself in his working paper (Foley, l99l) assumed as feasible only those microstates which
imply Pareto-superior and efficient allocations.
8As Feller (1970) has warned us, meaningful statistical aggregates can be constructed as composed
events by treating the cells, instead of the balls, as indistinguishable entities.
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many microstates listed in table III must be re-interpreted as composed events: for
instance row 1 would stiill describe a simple event with a single realization, in which
firm (d) supplies one unit of output to each customer, whereas the other firms
(a),(b),(c) are inactive; by contrast row 5 would describe a composed event with 3
rcalizations, as firm (c) can supply one unit of output to each of the three customers
altematively, whereas firm (d) supplies one unit to each of the two residrlal
customers and firms (a), (b) remain inactive. From this perspective, many
microstates in Table III should be conceived as macrostates that must be decomposed
in further microstates by replacing the occupancy model of balls and cells with a
model that counts all possible ways for assigning three quanta, initially
distinguishable, to four particles, initially distinguishable as well. Only at this
extended micro-level, the equal probability assumption should be applied and the
definition of the macrostates should be chosen.
On the other hand, the equal probability assumption refers to absolute
probabilities. It remains to be proved that a state of uniform absolute probability is a
steady state outcome of a stochastic process and that this outcome is independent from
the initial probability vector. In particular, in the industry model, gradual structural
changes could be more probable than major alterations in the size of the firms during
the same period of time. Thus, in the example described in Table III, it can be
supposed that, if the initial microstate is the one described in line I (with flrms a,b,c,
inactive and firm d of size 3), it can be more probable that microstate 5 (with firms a
and b still inactive, f,rrm c af size I and firm d at síze 2) will be realized in the
following trial than microstate 2 (firms a,b,d inactive and firm c of size 3). However,
under certain assumptions, these unequal conditional probabilities are compatible with
equal absolute probability of all possible microstates. In particular it can be
immediately proveds, using the theory of Markov chains that, if the transition matrix
is given and it is a doublv stochastic and primitive,lo then all microstates take equal
probabilities at the limit of a series of repeated trials and this uniform probability is
independent of the initial microstate (or, more generally, of the initial probability
vector). A special case of doubly stochastic transition matrix arises if we assume that
reversibility exists in the probabilistic sense between each pair of microstates of the
e See Feller (1970), chapter XV page 399; and Seneta (1973).
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Let pii be the transition probability from microstate i to microstate i in one trial and let 
" 
= t;l1) the mxm
transition matrix. P is called doubly stochast ic it l. P, = l, Z, p, = l, that is both the row sums and
the column sums of P are unity. Primitivity of P implies that there exists some power matrix P(t) of P whose
elements are all strictly positive.
L6
industry at each trial; that is the probability that the microstate i occurs, following the
realizatíonof the microstate j, is the same as the probability that j occurs, following the
realization of i. This hypothesis is represented by a mxm symmetrical transition
matrix.
In the next section it will be proved that equal probabilities can be deduced as
a limit property under assumptions less restrictive than that of double stochasticity.
4. Equal probabílity through non-línear Markov chains with lagged variables.
Let us introduce time lags and write
xr*l = f (x, ,xr-, ,....rxt-^) for t = 0r1r2,....
The vector x, 
= 
(r,r ,xp1...exs,)' shows the absolute probability x,, of microstate i in
period f . A prime indicates transposition. V/ith no fear of confusion, we also write
î 
= 
(ft,fz,...,fn)' . Let X, = (x,-, ,xr-m+',...,Xr )'. When the given function / is
homogeneous of degree one in each vector variable and continuously differentiable,
the above equation is now written as
Xr*r = AX' O)
where A is(ram)by (nxm) and
010000
001000
0001A=
,,r^, 
"tt-tl 
: : . fO,
A typical element of F(*) 1, 
--òl-.
" úr-k,i
To apply the Propositionin Appendix II, the assumptions we now make are:
Ass l. f is non decreasing in each variable.
Ass2. f, is homogeneous of degree one.
Ass 3. F(') has at least one positive entry in each row zts well as in each column.
L7
F(t) has at least one positive diagonal enfry.
Ass 4. e 
= 
f(e,e,...,e), where e 
= 
(l I n, I I n,.....,11 n).
Originally, f is defined on a subset of Bl.' because x, is a vector of
probability distribution. To satisfi Ass l, f is first to be extended to the whole ni*'
in anatural way. Ass 3 is to assure the primitivity of the process, i.e. the matrix A;
while Ass 4 requires that if the equal probabilities have been observed in the
consecutive m past periods, then that situation be continued as an equilibrium. It
should be noted that this is more general than the assumption of double stochasticity in
the linear case. More importantly, the equal distribution of the present period is not
enough to enswe the equilibrium state to be repeated.
Now we can apply the Proposition in Appendix II, and can assert that starting
from any Xo in B1*^, the process (p) , i.e. X,*, = AX,, yields a series which
converges to a unique X*. By the special form of A, we can deduce
X* : (x*, x*, ...,x*).
Finally by Ass 4, x*: e if each x* should be normalized so that it belongs to the unit
simplex.
With time lags being introduced, a more natural interpretation of the model is
now possible. That is, a society has a chain of memory, and accumulate the experience
of shift from one microstate to another, and these piled up "experience" or "memory"
affect the transition probabilities most plausibly in non-lineat way. Besides, in the
linear case, the speed of convergence is quick and at a geometric rate. Let us hope this
nice property continues to hold also in the non-linear case, and establishes the equal
probabilities in a blink as Nature may wish. Nature somehow seems to love "equality"
or at least equal opportunities for all.
Strong ergodicity in the case of nonlinear positive mappings has been extended
to the transformations on Banach spaces (see Fujimoto and Krause (1994). The
arguments above can hence be carried over to the spaces of an infinite dimension. It
may serve also to give a lower-level foundation to the equal-share principle in
thermodynamics and, in spirit, to that in quantum theory.
5. Fìnal consideralions
The two applications developed in sections I and2 have enabled us to point out
certain limitations on the transfer of the statistical equilibrium method from physics to
economics. These limitations seem to hold beyond the specific cases examined above.
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The basic difficulty for that transfer lies in the changeover from particles in physics to
intelligent units with memory and leaming skills. The method seems to be fully
successful only in those theoretical areas of economics where the microstates cannot be
ordered in terms of preferences or profrtability and furthermore the determinants of
statistical equilibrium are relatively persistent. These requirements have proved to be
plausible in the application to the economics of the industry, but they appeared rather
problematical in the application to a pure exchange economy. It should be noticed that,
in the application to the economics of the industry, rationality is not absent, because it
underlies the given demand D for the product, that can be interpreted as a classical
equilibrium quantity determined by a wider model of the economy.
Although the arguments presented in these notes have shown some comparative
advantage of the transfer of statistical equilibrium as a complement of classical long
period equilibrium, against the transfer of the same concept as a substitute for a
walrasian notion of equilibrium, some basic questions remain unanswered here for
further applications of the notion of statistical equilibrium within the former approach.
First, are there really any important areas of indeterminacy still left by the
classical equilibrium method apart from that of the constant returns industry examined
here ? We believe this to be so, even under the assumption of free competition where
there are no cases of indeterminacy due to strategic interactions among agents. One
important case of indeterminacy can be found in classical theory of value and
distribution if the labour force is supposed to be homogeneous as far as productive
efficiency is concemed, but to have non-homogeneous tastes. Suppose an economic
system with single product industries, constant returns to scale, free competition and a
fixed interest rate. In this case the non substitution theorem holds: the choice of the
cost-minimising technique and the long period prices of the commodities are uniquely
determined, but the amount and the composition of employment in terms of individual
tastes cannot be determined by the same economic criterion, even if some
correspondences are supposed to exist among prices, incomes and effective demand.
Hence the composition of social product remains indeterminate as well.
Secondly, in the case of the industry, it was assumed that the classical
method of equilibrium first determines the total output at the long period prices and
then the method of statistical equilibrium step in to frll the gap of indeterminacy left by
the first stage of analysis. In the more general cases such a logical sequence in the
application of two equilibrium methods might not work. This could happen in the
industry example, if the demand D would be affected in tum by some characteristic
value of the most probable structure of the industry itself, e.g. by the multiplier B
which appears in the firm distribution function (4).
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Thirdly, the concepts of Pareto-effrcient and Pareto-superior states of
the economy should be re-examined, if we adopt the method of statistical equilibrium.
In particular the notion of exoected utility seems more suitable compared to the
deterministic one adopted in section I in order to characterize some properties of
Foley's model.
It is left for future research programmes to explore the two routes through
which the concept of statistical equilibrium can be exported from physics to
economics. On the side of the classical approach, it is left to study whether that
concept is capable of filling other gaps of indeterminacy and to ascertain to what extent
the logical succession between the two stages of analysis mentioned above can be
usefully maintained. On the side of the approach proposed by Foley, it is left a more
ambitious task; in so far as that approach aims to replace other notions of equilibrium
for theorizing the economic system as a whole.
l
Appendix I
Solve
41w(n) = 
- 
l/!
to,t b-.,t o nolnrlnrl...nnl
subject to no + nr t nrt....nn = N (a)
0no +ln, +2nr+...+Qn, = Q (b).
For n large, the following approximation can be shown to hold using Stirling's
fomrula:
{nrt 
- 
n.l,rnn- n
where h t"the natr.ral logarithm.
We will freat t4orflr.rfrrr....fre as continuous variables and apply Lagrange
multiplier method.
We obtain the solution:
e-p"4 = t 
-g- ^ | s = 0,1,---rQ- (c)I 
"-P's=0
where p is an undetermined coeffrcient.
Let us consider the geometric progression:
a
Z"-'" = I + x * x2 +....+xa, with r = e-e.
s0
o1
Hence, as Q I @r Z"-u" + ;--. Substituting the limit in (c), we get:s=o I- X
4 = Ne-p'(l - 
"-0) . s:0,1...Q (d)
Substituting (d) in the constraint (b):
aN(l-e").>se-e"=Q (e)
s=0
l_1
To solve (e) with respect to B, we use the equation which holds at the limit$ ^-u' 1?u= 1-"
Differentiating both sides of this equation, we get:
a e-9I t"-u"s=o (l- 
"*)'
By substitution of (f) in (e):
o-F
*.---e (g)l-e
From (g)
p 
-hQ*{lQ,
which make solution (c) determined.
Appendix II
Suppose there exist n microstates, and letx be an n-column vector whose Èth
element represents the probability of microstate i. The symbol R" denotes the
Euclidean space of dimensionn, Ri the non negative ortant of R,, and
s' 
= {r e Rile''x = 1}, where e is an n-column vector whose elements are all unity.
In -R", an order > is induced by the cone Ri. we writex>y whenx >y and
x + y. and also write x >> y when x - y is in the interior of ,R "
Now a given continuous transformation / maps Rí i;;o itself, and satisfies the
following assumptions.
Assumptionl: f is monotone, i.e., l@)>/(y) whenx >y.
Assumption2: f isweakly homogeneous, i.e.,for any
x e Ri, î.eR*, we have f(),x): h(Ì,")f(x),
where : h: R* J R* is such that h(?,')/Ì,, is non increasing and ft(0):0.
Assumption3: f isprimitive, i.e., there exists a natural number m such that forxy e
Ri, x>y implies f' (x) >> f' (y).
Assumption 4: 'Whenx e S, then /(x)e S.
Assumption 5: f (el n): el n.
al_ l_ l_
Using the theorem and corollary I in Fujimoto and Krause (1985), it is easy to show
that Assumptions l-4 are sufficient to have a unique strictly positive x* e S.
Since x* is unique, this must coincide with elnbecatse of Assumption 5. Summaized
fts
Proposition Given Assumptions l-5, starting from any x e S, 
.f t (*) converges to
eln as f goes to infinity.
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